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a b s t r a c t
Following the entry into force of the Paris Agreement in November 2016, governments around the world
are now expected to turn their nationally determined contributions into concrete climate policies. Given
the global public good nature of climate change mitigation and the important cross-country differences
in marginal abatement costs, distributing mitigation efforts across countries could substantially lower
the overall cost of implementing climate policy. However, abating emissions abroad instead of domestically may face important political and popular resistance. We ran a lab experiment with more than 300
participants and asked them to choose between a domestic and an international reforestation project. We
tested the effect of three informational treatments on the allocation of participants’ endowment between
the domestic and the international project. The treatments consisted in: (1) making more salient the costeffectiveness gains associated with offsetting carbon abroad; (2) providing guarantees on the reliability of
reforestation programmes; (3) stressing local ancillary beneﬁts associated with domestic offset projects.
We found that stressing the cost-effectiveness of the reforestation programme abroad did increase its
support, the economic argument in favour of offsetting abroad being otherwise overlooked by participants. We relate this ﬁnding to the recent literature on the drivers of public support for climate policies,
generally pointing to a gap between people’s preferences and economists’ prescriptions.
© 2018 Department of Forest Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Umeå.
Published by Elsevier GmbH. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Introduction
Following the 2016 entry into force of the Paris Agreement,
governments are now expected to turn their greenhouse gas emissions pledges into concrete climate policies. These policies need
not only to be sufﬁciently effective to reach the emissions abatement objectives, but also to be as inexpensive as possible to leave
some economic and political room for further policy tightening, in

夽 We thank two anonymous reviewers and the editors at this journal, as well
as Matthew Kotchen, Michael Mendez and Alessandro Tavoni, for useful comments on a previous version of this paper. We also thank Anouk Curt for excellent
research assistance. Andrea Baranzini and Nicolas Borzykowski acknowledge funding from NRP 66 “Resource Wood” of the Swiss National Science Foundation (project
406640 142935). Stefano Carattini acknowledges funding from the Swiss National
Science Foundation, grant number P2SKP1 165028. The usual disclaimer applies.
∗ Corresponding author at: Haute école de gestion de Genève, rue de la Tambourine 17, GE-1227 Carouge, Switzerland.
E-mail address: nicolas.borzykowski@hesge.ch (N. Borzykowski).

particular when it will come to set new ambitions in 2023. Only in
this way, the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement can be
met. Since greenhouse gases mix uniformly in the atmosphere, and
given the important differences in cross-country marginal abatement costs, distributing abatement efforts across countries could
substantially lower the overall cost of implementing a global climate policy (Morris et al., 2012; Kriegler et al., 2014).
The choice of the policy instrument is crucial to ensure that
the abatement objectives can be reached at a reasonable cost.
Economists contend that carbon pricing represents the central
pillar of the policy package necessary to transform emissions targets into effective abatements (Goulder and Parry, 2008; Aldy and
Stavins, 2012). However, important political resistance opposes the
use of carbon pricing, which explains the limited diffusion of carbon
taxes and cap-and-trade programmes around the world (Baranzini
and Carattini, 2014; World Bank, 2017). The same resistance also
applies to the use of carbon offsets resulting from activities or
projects implemented abroad, but used to compensate domestic
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the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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emissions, as well as, more generally, to the mechanisms permitting the compensation of emissions among countries (Monbiot,
2007; Schneider, 2009). For instance, the European Union (EU)
Emissions Trading Scheme capped until 2013 the amount of carbon credits that ﬁrms could buy from emissions abatement projects
taking place outside the EU. Since 2013, international credits are
no longer accepted. Similarly, the use of international offsets is
currently capped in the California cap-and-trade scheme, and international offsets may disappear altogether from this scheme as it
enters the third compliance period in 2018. In the case of California, strong resistance to the use of offsets comes in particular from
local environmental justice groups, which claim that ﬁrms should
reduce their emissions locally, and provide co-beneﬁts to local communities (Schatzki and Stavins, 2009; Pastor et al., 2013). The 2009
Waxman–Markey bill also included a cap for the use of carbon
offsets, related to the location of abatement efforts. Domestic and
international offset programmes were each capped at 1 billion metric tons, with the possibility for the US Environmental Protection
Agency to shift part of the domestic cap to international offsets
only if it could be determined that the domestic supply was insufﬁcient. The room for abating greenhouse gas emissions abroad is
also limited by law in other contexts. In Switzerland, for instance, a
minimum of 30% of the total emissions reduction must be achieved
domestically. Stronger requirements may apply for some industries. For instance, fossil-thermal power plants are required to offset
all of their emissions, 50% of which must be compensated domestically.
At the same time, some countries, such as Norway, Finland,
Sweden or Costa Rica, plan to become carbon neutral over the next
decades, an objective that potentially implies a large use of offsetting practices. While Costa Rica plans to undertake local measures
to offset emissions through reforestation, reaching this objective
in Scandinavian countries would very likely require the purchase
of a substantial amount of carbon offsets from foreign countries.
Sweden, for instance, plans to cut its domestic emissions by 85%,
while offsetting the remaining amount. This paper is motivated
by the conﬂict between the large potential cost savings associated
with abating emissions through projects implemented abroad and
the possible political resistance to such practice.
Some evidence already suggests that the public may not always
favour the most efﬁciency-enhancing solution in climate policy,
even when pay-offs are transparent (Cherry et al., 2012). People
may not even pay attention to the provided quantity of public good,
if their motivation is impurely altruistic and driven by the moral
satisfaction of contributing (cf. Andreoni, 1990). For instance, using
stated preferences methods, Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) ﬁnd
that the willingness to pay for a public good may not be inﬂuenced
by the quantity provided: individuals may not necessarily understand that different quantities of public good can be provided with
the same contribution. This difference can, however, be very large,
especially for environmental goods such as carbon offsets, whose
costs can vary greatly depending on location.
In addition, practical reservations have been raised to the purchase of international carbon offsets. Evidence of abuses in the
additionality condition have clearly contributed to reduce the
credibility of the UNFCCC’s mechanisms to facilitate international
emissions trading, such as the Clean Development Mechanism and
Joint Implementation (see Schneider and Kollmuss, 2015; Tirole,
2012). In the light of these critiques, the preference that the general
public seems to give to local projects, and to standards certifying
projects generating emissions offsets abroad, should not surprise
(see Blasch and Farsi, 2014). However, beyond this, little is known
on how to overcome these obstacles and increase the popularity of
international carbon offsets.
A new literature analysing this question empirically is thus
needed. Torres et al. (2015) use a choice experiment to test the

effect of distance to the mitigation site on the propensity to support
mitigation activities. This stated preference study ﬁnds a preference
for local mitigation, which provides local co-beneﬁts. All potential
mitigation sites are, however, located in Mexico, where the survey
takes place. The international dimension, and the related heterogeneity in abatement costs, is thus left for future research. Two
additional studies shed more light on the question of domestic vs.
international abatements. Anderson and Bernauer (2016) recruit
participants on an online labour market and analyse the effect of
different informational treatments on stated support for domestic vs. international offsets. People seem to express higher support
for international abatements when the argument of efﬁciency (vs.,
e.g. ethicality) is raised, even though no real carbon offsets are proposed and no real monetary consequences are present. Diederich
and Goeschl (2017) recruit German participants on an online survey platform to participate in an experiment in which, depending
on the treatment, they may be offered the purchase of local (EUbased) or developing country offsets. Inference is this time based
on revealed preferences. In the local treatment, participants are
reminded that it is in Germany, where they live, that they are
generating emissions. In the developing country treatment, participants are informed that the offset projects are certiﬁed Gold
Standard and will be realised in an environmentally-friendly way
while providing beneﬁts to the local population (such as jobs). The
demand for these two offset options is compared to a neutrallyframed treatment (the control group), where the location of the
abatement is also explicit (the EU), but no attempts to stimulate
guilt or affect decisions are made. Diederich and Goeschl (2017)
analyse the demand for carbon offsets across treatments and ﬁnd
that location does not matter. If anything, their informational treatments increase overall contributions with respect to the neutral
framing. Note, however, that in all treatments, including the neutral
framing, participants are informed that the climate is indifferent
about where mitigation is carried out (that is, location does not
matter).
Our paper also uses experimental methods, inferring from
revealed preferences. We contribute to this nascent literature by
focusing speciﬁcally on the allocation decision that determines how
demand for domestic vs. international offsets changes depending
on the information provided. Our approach thus exploits a real
situation, in which there is a real difference in location and abatement costs between two otherwise similar offsetting projects. In
this setting, we analysed the role of informational treatments in
conjunction with the real difference in the offset price tag. In short,
our experiment went as follows. We gathered about 300 students in
the lab and observed how they allocated their endowment between
two reforestation projects, one taking place domestically and one
abroad. We provided three randomised informational treatments.
The treatments mimicked the role of a political campaign trying to
foster (or hamper) the political support for generating carbon offsets from reforestation projects implemented in a foreign country,
instead of domestically. Two treatments played in favour of carbon
offsets generated abroad by (1) emphasising the cost-effectiveness
related to international projects and (2) giving guarantees on the
reliability of the reforestation programmes. The third treatment
stressed the local ancillary beneﬁts from domestic carbon offset
projects in terms of biodiversity, recreational activities, protection
from natural disasters and local employment. We compared these
three treatment groups with a control group, subject to a neutrallyframed treatment.
We found that stressing the cost-effectiveness of the international reforestation programme led to a signiﬁcant increase in
contributions to the latter. That is, some participants seemed to
overlook the price differential, absent any speciﬁc treatment leveraging it. We did not ﬁnd any effect for the other treatments.
Participants seemed to already factor in the existence of local co-

A. Baranzini et al. / Journal of Forest Economics 32 (2018) 1–12

beneﬁts and seemed not to be questioning the credibility of the
selected reforestation programmes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section “Methodology” introduces our hypotheses, the experimental
design, and the econometric approach. Section “Results” presents
our data and results. Section “Conclusion” concludes.

Methodology
Economic background and hypotheses
In this paper, we focus on reforestation programmes. The potential for climate change mitigation of forest projects is considered
substantial (Bellassen and Luyssaert, 2014), given the generally low
marginal costs of reforestation (van Kooten et al., 2004; Tavoni et al.,
2007; Nielsen et al., 2014). In addition, it is estimated that 20% of
global greenhouse gas emissions are caused by deforestation, twice
as much as transportation (IPCC, 2014). As a result, avoided deforestation and af-/re-forestation programmes may play an important
role in climate change mitigation. For instance, Potter et al. (2007)
estimate that up to 20% of US emissions could be offset through
forests sinks. Forest offsets are encouraged since the Kyoto Protocol within the LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry)
activities of the Clean Development Mechanism (UNFCCC, 2007)
and may also play an important role in the achievement of the
recent agreement that the International Civil Aviation Organization
reached in October 2016 to limit the growth of carbon emissions
in the civil aviation sector. According to this voluntary agreement,
from 2020, any increase in airline carbon emissions should be compensated through the purchase of carbon offsets.
The abundance of opportunities for carbon sinks in forests is
only one of the reasons for focusing on forest offsets. From an experimental perspective, forests provide two additional beneﬁts. First,
forest-based offsets are cognitively easy to understand for participants. Second, while trees and forests may differ across countries in
many characteristics, they can still represent the ideal of a homogeneous good in terms of CO2 sequestration. Indeed, the effect on
climate change mitigation of one ton of abated CO2 is the same irrespective of the abatement location. In our experiment, relatively
precise information on the CO2 sequestration ability of each tree is
available for both reforestation programmes in our study.
We are, however, aware of the concerns that have been raised
about the limits of forest sinks. Unlike decarbonisation processes,
such as the development of renewable energy, forests sinks are
affected by the so-called “permanence problem” (Gren and Zeleke,
2016). Indeed, uncertainties regarding climate change, the occurrence of wildﬁres or future anthropogenic activities, provide no
guarantee that all new forests (and thus the stored carbon) will
stand in the long run (Galik and Jackson, 2009). Given that carbon sequestration in forests is potentially reversible (Watson
et al., 2000), some national policies do not include international
afforestation programmes in their eligible offset programmes (e.g.
Swiss Federal Council, 2016).
On top of these forest-speciﬁc concerns, one may have general reservations regarding the additionality, or ethical foundations,
of offset programmes in general (Anderson, 2012; Tirole, 2012;
Schneider and Kollmuss, 2015; Carattini and Tavoni, 2016). Practical reservations may be related to the (in)effectiveness of
carbon credits. Ethical considerations may be related to the “commodiﬁcation” of nature, which is an argument often used by
environmentalists to oppose the use of market-based solutions
to environmental externalities (Baron and Leshner, 2000; Sandel,
2012; Braaten et al., 2015).
In this paper, we analyse the demand for local and international
forest offsets despite their potential weaknesses. While our main
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research question concerns the preference for domestic vs. international carbon offsets, in our experimental setting we also consider
the general demand for carbon offsets and take care of potential
concerns that our participants may have towards them.
From an economic perspective, purchasing carbon offsets is a
real-life decision with a private cost to the individual. Individuals
may be willing to voluntarily contribute to a public good such as
climate change mitigation if, for instance, they derive some utility
from the public good being provided (in case of pure altruism) or if
they derive some utility from their contribution, due to warm glow
(Andreoni, 1990) or positive self-image (Nyborg et al., 2006). In the
case of offsets, individuals may also be willing to engage in the private provision of a public good if this may allow compensating other
activities to which they contributed and that might have reduced
the overall level of the same public good (Kotchen, 2009). Following the environmental psychology literature, we would expect
pro-environmental behaviour to depend positively on the following two arguments. First, the feeling of responsibility to contribute
to the environmental public good at stake, the so-called “ascription of responsibility”. Second, the perception of the environmental
impact that behaving in a pro-environmental way would generate, the so-called “awareness of consequences” (see e.g. Stern et al.,
1999).
Concerning the preferences for domestic vs. international carbon offsets, we considered three main drivers. Cost-effectiveness
reasons justify international offsetting. However, experimental evidence from markets with externalities suggest that people may
overlook efﬁciency gains, even with salient pay-off structures. This
problem is particularly relevant for climate change mitigation.
Kallbekken et al. (2011) show how tax aversion can affect Pigouvian taxes, hampering the implementation of instruments that
would increase efﬁciency in the experiment, and allow for pay-off
maximisation (cf. also Kallbekken et al., 2010). When it comes to
internalising externalities, “half” measures such as subsidies may
be preferred to “full” measures such as carbon taxes. That is, also in
the lab, where the most cost-effective solution can be relatively
easily identiﬁed, people may prefer sub-optimal solutions, even
though these may imply lower pay-offs (Cherry et al., 2012).
People’s ethical and practical reservations to the use of carbon
offsets, as described above, may also be inﬂuenced by the location
of the offset project. We conjecture that these reservations, of practical character in particular, may be stronger in the case of projects
undertaken in emerging economies. For instance, Gampfer et al.
(2014) ﬁnd that international climate transfers receive more public support if the donation is made to a trustworthy government.
Blasch and Farsi (2014) ﬁnd that certiﬁcations by a trusted government agency or a United Nations body increase the willingness to
pay for carbon offsetting. People may also have genuine preferences
for local offsets. For instance, people could expect substantial local
co-beneﬁts from offsetting, which would increase the propensity
to choose a domestic project (Torres et al., 2015).
Hence, we formulate the following hypotheses on the potential effect of each type of informational treatment applied in our
experiment:

Efﬁciency hypothesis: Participants may pay attention to the
amount allocated to carbon offsets, but not necessarily to the total
quantity of emissions abated. Reminding them the cost differential
between domestic and international reforestation programmes
increases the amount allocated to foreign programmes and thus
the overall abatement of carbon emissions.
Conﬁdence hypothesis: Participants may not ﬁnd projects abroad
trustworthy. Providing guarantees on the trustworthiness of reforestation project providers increases the amount allocated to
programmes abroad and thus overall abatement.
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Local beneﬁts hypothesis: Given that the main focus of the considered reforestation programmes is on greenhouse gas emissions,
participants may neglect their local beneﬁts. Reminding them the
beneﬁts of local forests increases the amount allocated to domestic
reforestation programmes.
Most of the recent literature has examined the demand for carbon offsets relying on stated preferences, while only a few papers
attempted to provide evidence based on revealed preferences by
using lab and ﬁeld experiments.1 Since stated preferences are subject to several well-known biases (see e.g. Alberini and Kahn, 2006),
in this paper, we empirically address the acceptability of international carbon offsets using an experimental approach. Such an
approach is arguably the best tool for inferring from revealed preferences, testing the effect of alternative policy designs that are not
yet observed in reality, and causally identifying the effect of our
treatments on people’s preferences (Falk and Heckman, 2009). In
addition, the type of behaviour observed in the lab can be very
similar to the one undertaken in a similar natural setting, and the
behavioural responses of student and non-student participants in
lab experiments are often the same (cf. Alm et al., 2015). When it
comes to analysing pro-social behaviour, or preferences over policies, one may argue that the likelihood that behaviour in the lab
differs from a real-life situation increases. While this can be true,
pro-social behaviour in the lab remains strongly correlated with
pro-social behaviour in the ﬁeld (Benz and Meier, 2008). That said,
we are aware that each methodological decision involves a tradeoff and we devote a section, below, to the external validity of our
results, and how it may have implications for policy recommendations.
Experimental design
Following from the previous section, we selected two real reforestation programmes providing the same abatement per tree in
both the domestic (developed) and the foreign (developing) country, but with a much lower price in the latter. The programme in
the home country was located in Visp, Switzerland, while the programme in the developing country was located in Limay, Nicaragua.
In these programmes, a tree in both Switzerland and Nicaragua captured 15 kg of CO2 per year, while its price was 10 Swiss francs (CHF)
in the former and only 3 in the latter country.2 That is, given the
price differential, with the same budget (e.g. with the same ﬁscal
revenues from a carbon tax), emissions abatements could be three
times larger in Nicaragua.
We ran the experiment in Geneva, Switzerland, in December
2015, with a sample of more than 300 undergraduate students in
business administration (management) in their ﬁrst or second year,
all enrolled in mandatory microeconomics classes at the introductory or intermediate level.3 The experiment was conducted during
class time, to prevent students’ self-selection. After entering the
class, we brieﬂy presented the experiment and instructed participants as per standard procedure in lab experiments.
The experiment was organised in two stages. A ﬁrst stage
determined participants’ endowment, and their voluntary contribution to carbon offset projects. The allocation of this contribution
between domestic and international projects was the focus of the
second stage.

1
Stated preference studies include Brouwer et al. (2008), MacKerron et al. (2009),
Carlsson et al. (2012), Blasch and Farsi (2014), Gampfer et al. (2014), Blasch and
Ohndorf (2015), and Torres et al. (2015). Ovchinnikova et al. (2009), Löfgren et al.
(2012), Diederich and Goeschl (2014, 2017), and Kesternich et al. (2016), are examples of revealed preference studies.
2
1CHF ≈ 1USD at the time of the study.
3
See Appendix B for the full questionnaire (translated from French).

Table 1
Reforestation programmes.

Place
CO2 /tree/year
Cost/tree

Programme 1

Programme 2

Visp, Switzerland
15 kg
CHF 10

Limay, Nicaragua
15 kg
CHF 3

In the ﬁrst stage, participants were randomly provided with
4 very general questions about microeconomics, whose answers
determined their monetary endowment, along with a show-up fee
of 2 Swiss francs. Each correct answer was rewarded with 2 francs,
and so participants had the possibility to earn up to 8 additional
francs.
Once the endowment was determined, participants were given
the option to donate a share of it to the purchase of carbon offsets through reforestation programmes. At this stage, participants
only decided how much money they wanted to spend on the purchase of carbon offsets and how much to keep for themselves,
without further information on the speciﬁcities of the reforestation programme. Participants were informed about some basic facts
of climate change; were introduced to the role of deforestation
in increasing the stock of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere; and were made aware of the role of reducing deforestation
or increasing afforestation in helping mitigating climate change.
All participants had also been informed that a nominal reforestation certiﬁcate could have been made available to all purchasers of
carbon offsets, if they were willing to declare their identity once
completed the experiment. This procedure might have reassured
participants that the purchase of carbon offsets was really taking
place, besides providing some reputational effects, which in general tend to have a signiﬁcant positive impact on the contribution
to a public good (Milinski et al., 2002).
In the second stage, once the amount dedicated to reforestation
had been elicited, participants were asked to split it between the
two speciﬁc programmes. This decision represented our outcome
of interest, as it allowed understanding the preferences of people
towards generating carbon offsets through a domestic or an international reforestation programme. Basic information about both
reforestation programmes was provided to all participants as done
in Table 1.4
Furthermore, additional information was randomly provided
in the form of the following three treatments. Treatment 1 (T1)
stressed the price differential between a tree in Nicaragua and in
Switzerland, emphasising that funding the least-cost programme
would have resulted in higher emissions abatement, for a ﬁxed
contribution. T1 had thus been designed to test the efﬁciency
hypothesis. Treatment 2 (T2) informed participants that both programmes had been guaranteed by reputable and independent
institutions: the United Nations Environment Programme for the
Nicaraguan project and the local government for the domestic
programme. Hence, this treatment had been designed to test the
conﬁdence hypothesis. Treatment 3 (T3) introduced the role of local
ancillary beneﬁts of reforestation. We recalled to participants the
recreational activities that the Swiss population uses to undertake
in local forests, the importance of these forests for the local biodiversity, their beneﬁts in terms of wood and non-wood products, as
well as their contribution to local jobs and economic growth. T3 had
been designed to test the local beneﬁts hypothesis, favouring the
domestic reforestation programme. A control group was assigned

4
Information on these reforestation programmes is available at https://www.
helvetia.com/ch/content/fr/qui-sommes-nous/engagement/foret-protectrice.html
(last accessed on November 26th , 2015) and http://www.tree-nation.com/plant
(last accessed on November 26th , 2015).
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a very neutral messaging. Following the standard procedure, we
administered a short debrieﬁng survey to understand students’
contributions and collected the usual socio-economic characteristics.

We analysed separately the data from the two stages of our
experiment. The ﬁrst stage determined participants’ contributions
to the purchase of carbon offsets. The second stage captured the
allocation decision between the domestic and international reforestation programmes. In the empirical analyses, the second stage
addressed our main research question. In the ﬁrst stage, given
that our outcome variable, the ratio of contribution to forest programmes over endowment, was continuous and bounded between
0 and 1, we estimated both an ordinary least square (OLS) model
and a speciﬁc generalised linear model for fractional outcomes
(GLM), as recommended by Baum (2008).5
In the econometric analysis of the second stage, we tested
whether the differences among treatments were statistically signiﬁcant, conditional on covariates, and assessed the magnitude of
the treatment effects. We tested the following speciﬁcation:
Yi = ˛ + ˇ1 T1 + ˇ2 T2 + ˇ3 T3 + Xi + i

Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable

Contributors

Non-contributors

Endowment

7.15
(1.90)
5.81
(2.59)
0.83
(0.30)
261

7.34
(1.93)
0
(0)
0
(0)
46

Contribution

Econometric approach

(1)

in which our dependent variable Y is the percentage of participant i’s contribution allocated to the reforestation programme
implemented abroad, ˛ a constant and ˇj the treatment effect
for treatments j = 1, 2, 3. Xi is a vector of control variables and 
the vector of associated coefﬁcients. Controls take into account
the possible heterogeneity across individuals, along with i , the
heteroskedasticity-robust standard error.6 Since the dependent
variable was bounded between 0 and 1, we also estimated this
model with OLS and GLM.
We then checked whether the treatment effects occurred on the
intensive or extensive margins. For each treatment, we could have
observed the same proportion of participants contributing to the
international programme as in the control group, but these could
on average have been contributing a different amount (intensive
margin). Alternatively, we could have observed a different proportion of participants contributing a positive sum to the international
programme, without necessarily providing a different contribution,
on average, than the control group (extensive margin).
To isolate the role of the extensive margin, we assessed, with
OLS and logit models, the effect of the treatments on the proportion of individuals contributing a strictly positive amount to the
international programme. We provided a further robustness test
exploiting a two-part model “à la Cragg”, which is appropriate for
limited dependent variables and integrates both ﬁrst stage and second stage decisions into a single two-parts model. Following Cragg
(1971), we considered that the decisions to contribute and the level
of this contribution might have been two different but simulta-

5
A tobit model could also be a potential candidate for a non-linear ﬁt of our data.
We thus followed Papke and Wooldridge (1993) and applied a speciﬁcation link test
to select the most appropriate model between the fractional logit GLM, and a tobit
model. The speciﬁcation test rejected the null hypothesis of good link speciﬁcation
for the tobit model (p-value < 0.001), whereas it did not for the fractional logit GLM
(p-value > 0.99). Based on the test outcome, we selected GLM as our preferred nonlinear speciﬁcation. All additional estimations are available by the authors upon
request.
6
Due to the randomised allocation of the treatments, the inclusion of control
variables did not affect the coefﬁcients of the observed treatment effects, but it did
increase the model’s precision. Descriptive statistics for these variables are available
in Table A.2 in Appendix A. The number of observations only slightly decreased
when introducing control variables. The use of heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors was justiﬁed by standard heteroskedasticity tests such as modiﬁed Wald and
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests.

5

Contribution (% of initial endowment)
Observations
Standard deviations in parentheses.

neous decisions, potentially driven by different factors. The ﬁrst
part of the model thus explained the probability to contribute to
forest carbon offsetting with a probit model, and the second part
explained the level of this contribution, conditional on strictly positive contributions.7
Results
Descriptive statistics and ﬁrst stage
Table 2 provides information on the ﬁrst stage for the full sample. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are available
in Table A.1 in Appendix A. On average, participants contributed to
climate change mitigation with about 6 francs each, i.e. about 80%
of the average endowment of about 7 francs. Yet, 15% of them were
not willing to contribute to reforestation at all.
In this stage, we analysed the propensity to contribute to a
generic reforestation programme generating carbon offsets, relative to the initial endowment, and its determinants. To measure
ascription of responsibility, we used two variables. The ﬁrst variable was the standard measure of climate concern from the Gallup
survey (cf. Lee et al., 2015) and the World Value Survey (WVS). Individuals were asked to answer on a 5 Likert scale from “I do not agree
at all” to “I totally agree” to the following statement: “I consider that
climate warming is a serious threat for the future”. We transformed
this variable into a binary measure (called climate concern) taking
the value 1 if an individual “pretty much agrees” or “totally agrees”,
and 0 otherwise. As shown by the descriptive statistics in Table A.1
in Appendix A, the variable for climate concern scored particularly
high, with 86% of the sample declaring to be concerned by climate
change. For comparison, in the 2007 wave of the World Values Survey, climate concern in Switzerland was about 89%. The second
variable was a dummy taking value 1 if participants felt morally
obliged to contribute to climate change mitigation (we call it moral
obligation). This variable resulted from the “pretty much agree” and
“totally agree” answers to the following statement: “I feel morally
obliged to protect the climate.” Compared to climate concern, a
relatively lower proportion (67%) stated to feel morally obliged to
contribute to climate change mitigation.
To measure awareness of consequences, we used a variable capturing the belief that even small contributions to climate change
can be important, such as the ones under examination in this study.
This question was worded as follows: “How do you agree to the
following statement? ‘In my opinion, even small contributions are

7
The Cragg model is intuitively similar to the Heckman two-stage model. However, our data did not suffer from a selection issue, as in Heckman (1977). In our
experiment we, indeed, did not face missing data, but a “corner at 0” issue (see
Wooldridge, 2010, chapter 16). That is, zeros were not present because of nonobservable responses but were rather the result of an optimal choice made by the
respondent. The Cragg model allows for two separate simultaneous decisions but
does not correct for selection. It was thus the most appropriate approach for our context. It also allowed to have the same covariates in both parts of the model without
the risk of collinearity (Madden, 2008).
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useful to protect the climate’ ”. 85% of the sample considered that
even small contributions can be important.
We note that considering a public good as important is a necessary, but not sufﬁcient, condition for its voluntary provision
(Nyborg et al., 2006). That is, people cannot contribute to the provision of all public goods that they deem important. Whether an
individual is willing to contribute to a given good also depends on
the descriptive norm concerning the provision of such good, i.e.
what others do. Much evidence has been provided on conditional
cooperation in local environments (cf. Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).
However, conditional cooperation in the climate commons may
appear less likely. Yet, according to Ostrom (2009), managing global
dilemmas requires as much trust as managing local dilemmas does.
Ostrom’s claim relies on the observed existence of reciprocity and
trust at the local level, which may beneﬁt the provision of any
social good, regardless of its local or global characteristics. Supporting Ostrom’s intuition, Carattini et al. (2015) ﬁnd for instance a
negative correlation between trust and greenhouse gas emissions
among European countries. Ostrom’s element of trust reconciles
with the model of Nyborg et al. (2006): since the descriptive norm
is not always salient, individuals may form expectations on other
people’s contributions (see also Carattini et al., 2017b). This case
applied to our experiment since communication was strictly forbidden between players. Hence, to estimate the effect of expected
cooperation, we used a measure of participants’ belief of others’
contribution. This variable was based on the answers to the following question: “In your opinion, what share of their endowment
other participants on average contributed to the reforestation programme?”.
We also added to the model a few variables that were related to
the speciﬁcity of the public good under scrutiny. Since no details on
the location of the reforestation programmes were provided at this
stage, it is plausible that some individuals, especially those who
were used to visit local forests, might have been more likely to
contribute than others. Frequent usage is indeed a common determinant of contribution to the provision of ecosystem services in
general (Czajkowski et al., 2014). We thus asked how often the participant used to visit forests, in general, and added to the model a
dummy variable to account for regular or frequent visits.
Since no guarantee on the quality of the project was given at the
ﬁrst stage, we captured possible practical reservations to the use of
forest carbon offsets. Our variable measured the degree of agreement with the following statement: “Reforestation is effective in
reducing the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere in the long run”. To capture general ethical considerations related to the commodiﬁcation
of nature, we exploited answers to the following statement: “I do
not want to consider natural resources as a marketed commodity.”
Table 3 presents our estimates. Columns (1) and (2) show our
coefﬁcients for OLS and the average marginal effect of a fractional
logit GLM, respectively. Since all estimates were statistically the
same in both OLS and GLM models, and to allow for straightforward
interpretation, we comment in what follows the estimated effects
based on OLS.
All the coefﬁcients had the expected sign, except the one associated with green membership, but the latter was not statistically
signiﬁcant. Our results suggests that the demand for carbon offsets
generated by reforestation programmes is dominated, statistically
speaking, by attitudinal variables, in particular, the belief that small
contributions do help to make a difference, as well as the belief
about others’ contributions. Results about the belief of others’ contributions match the recent evidence of Blasch and Farsi (2014),
Blasch and Ohndorf (2015) and Schwirplies and Ziegler (2016). All
these studies indeed ﬁnd a positive effect on the demand for carbon
offsets for variables very similar to our measure of beliefs about others’ behaviour, namely, and respectively, “expected cooperation”,
“expected share of offset customers in society” and “expectation

Table 3
Average marginal effects on contributions.

Climate concern
Small contributions are important
Green member
Moral obligation
Belief about others’ contribution
Frequent forest user
Practical reservations w.r.t. reforestation
Ethical reservations w.r.t. the
commodiﬁcation of nature
Observations
Adjusted-R2

(1)
OLS

(2)
GLM

0.039
(0.08)
0.13*
(0.07)
−0.001
(0.05)
0.0099
(0.05)
0.71***
(0.06)
0.071
(0.05)
−0.069
(0.05)
−0.024

0.016
(0.07)
0.11*
(0.06)
−0.008
(0.06)
0.016
(0.04)
0.68***
(0.05)
0.070
(0.05)
−0.055
(0.04)
−0.016

(0.04)

(0.04)

299
0.347

299

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*
p < 0.1.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.

of society”. Along with related literature showing similar patterns
for other climate-friendly behaviours, this evidence can be used
to support the existence of conditional cooperation in the climate
commons (Carattini et al., 2017b).
Not surprisingly for a lab experiment, even for those with a
relatively large sample, none of the other covariates reached the
standard threshold for statistical signiﬁcance, despite the expected
sign. We note in particular that the frequent use of forests, or having practical reservations related to forest offsets, had no signiﬁcant
impact on the average contribution to reforestation programmes.
In the questionnaire, we also asked for participants’ income.
Given the non-negligible decline in observations that the inclusion of the income variable implied, we did not consider income
differences in our model. Yet, we note that running additional estimations with such variable did not statistically affect the estimates
of Table 3, while the coefﬁcient for the income variable was found
to be statistically insigniﬁcant. This result was unsurprising in our
context, also because the private demand for environmental quality
was likely to be only partially expressed, due to the (global) public
good characteristics of climate change mitigation (cf. Roca, 2003).
Second stage
The second stage included only participants providing a strictly
positive monetary contribution to the generic reforestation programme. We examined the decision to allocate such contribution
between the domestic and the international reforestation programme. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the three
treatments or the control group, which resulted in 59–70 observations for each treatment. We created our variable of interest
as a ratio, with the participant’s contribution to the reforestation
programme abroad as numerator, and her total contribution as
denominator. We expected this ratio to be affected by the informational treatments as discussed in Section “Economic background
and hypotheses”. Table 4 shows some statistics for our dependent
variable for each treatment group. Interestingly, 86% of all contributors who faced the neutral treatment accepted to contribute a
positive amount to the international programme, with the average
contribution at 63%. This suggests that participants to the experiment might not have opposed the principle of having emissions
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Table 4
Allocation of the monetary contributions to the programme abroad, per treatment.

Mean contribution to the
international programme (% of
total contribution)
Frequency of contributions to the
international programme > 0
Observations

T0

T1

T2

T3

0.63

0.73

0.64

0.59

(0.35)
0.86

(0.36)
0.88

(0.34)
0.87

(0.33)
0.86

(0.35)
59

(0.33)
66

(0.34)
70

(0.35)
66

Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 5
Average treatment effects.
(1)
OLS

(2)
GLM

0.11*
(0.06)
0.026
(0.06)
−0.025
(0.06)

0.12*
(0.06)
0.025
(0.06)
−0.024
(0.05)

Covariates

Yes

Yes

Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC

256
0.15
148.5

256

Efﬁciency treatment (T1)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3)

1.08

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*
p < 0.1.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.

abatements taking place abroad. For comparison, Diederich and
Goeschl (2017) ﬁnd that when the cost of abating at home or abroad
is (artiﬁcially) the same, people seem to have no preference for
either one or the other location. Hence, a large proportion of our
participants seemed to pay some attention to the price differential,
even though they might have not fully internalised its implications
for cost-effectiveness. A substantial part of the sample might have
however been overlooking this differential, unless they had speciﬁc preferences or concerns in favour of one project or another. As
expected, we observed some variation across treatments. In particular, contributions to the international reforestation programme
were the highest with the efﬁciency treatment, and the lowest with
the local beneﬁts treatment.
As shown by Table 5, the estimates for the variables of interest
were robust across OLS and GLM speciﬁcations. In what follows, we
thus again interpret the results based on the OLS estimates.8

8
The estimates for the control variables are displayed in Table A.3 in Appendix
A. All coefﬁcients had the expected sign, but most variables were not statistically
signiﬁcant. Declaring to be a frequent visitor of forests did not signiﬁcantly affect the
contribution to the local programme, nor did having previous experience with the
domestic forest mentioned in the experiment. General ethical reservations such as
being unwilling to consider natural resources as a marketed commodity, as well as
other ethical concerns related to international offsets, such as opposition to carbon
markets or concerns on the fairness of offsetting domestic emissions abroad, did not
reach statistical signiﬁcance either. Given the relatively low number of observations
and low variability of these variables, these results were not particularly surprising.
Related to the previous discussion on conditional cooperation in the climate commons, we found that expectations about others’ behaviour also shaped the allocation
decision. Finally, a variable taking value 1 for second-year students was associated
to higher contributions to the international reforestation programme. This result
seemed consistent with Braaten et al. (2015), who maintain that students in economics are typically trained to focus on outcomes, i.e. on efﬁciency. A relatively large
strand of literature on the behaviour of economists tends to conﬁrm this result. The
main reference is, arguably, Marwell and Ames (1981), who ﬁnd with lab experiments that graduate students in economics are more likely to respond to economic
incentives than other subpopulations, in particular by free riding in the provision of

7

Compared to the control group, the reference in the regressions,
we found that all treatments have the expected sign. The informational treatment that reminded the importance of efﬁciency
reasons (T1) and the treatment that provided guarantees on the
quality of the offset programmes (T2) had both a positive impact on
the relative allocation to the reforestation programme in Nicaragua.
Likewise, the local beneﬁts treatment (T3) increased the likelihood
of funding the domestic programme. However, only the efﬁciency
treatment had a statistically signiﬁcant impact. This result suggested that participants tended to not completely factor in the
efﬁciency argument supporting the use of international carbon offsets. Our causal estimate suggested that the efﬁciency treatment
led to a 11 percentage point increase in the contribution to the programme generating carbon offsets abroad, compared to the neutral
framing of the control group.
The statistical insigniﬁcance of T2 suggested that a potential
lack of credibility of the international programme was not a major
concern for the individuals in the sample. Debrieﬁng questions
reported that only 12% of participants did not trust the Nicaraguan
government for the implementation of the international reforestation programme, while no participant stated distrust in the Swiss
government. Furthermore, we note that trust in the Nicaraguan
government for the sub-sample having experienced T2 was not
statistically different than the reported average for the whole sample, supporting this explanation. Other reasons could contribute to
this result. It could be that the scepticism towards carbon offsets
affected domestic and international reforestation programmes in
the same way.
In the same spirit, we found that participants accounted already
to a large extent for the potential beneﬁts derived by the local
programme, including how it might have supported the local biodiversity, which explained the limited effectiveness of T3 in boosting
contributions to the local programme. It is worth noting that, in
recent times, Swiss forests have been growing in both standing
wood volume and surface and that their health is generally considered as good. The expectation of local co-beneﬁts might thus
have been limited in our context. In addition, in Switzerland, the
forestry sector contributes to only 0.1% of total employment and
0.06% of GDP (Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 2017).
Our results showed that the efﬁciency treatment increased the
average contribution to the international reforestation programme
relative to the domestic reforestation programme. This increased
contribution could take two forms. In the efﬁciency treatment,
we could have either observed the same proportion of participants contributing to the international programme as in the control
group, but these would have been on average be contributing more.
On the other hand, we could have observed a higher proportion
of participants contributing a positive sum to the international
programme, without necessarily having a different average contribution. That is, the change in behaviour could have taken place both
on the intensive and extensive margins, respectively. To isolate the
effect of the extensive margin, we looked at the treatment effects
on the proportion of individuals contributing a positive amount to
the international programme. In the same spirit, we also looked at
heterogeneous treatment effects to determine whether responses
to this treatment varied based on some of the participants’ characteristics.
Intensive vs. extensive margin
Descriptive statistics in Table 4 show that the proportion of
strictly positive contributions to the international programme did
not differ signiﬁcantly across treatments. This is conﬁrmed by the

public goods. Other notable studies on economists include Frey and Meier (2003)
and O’Roark and Wood (2011).
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Table 6
Average treatment effects on the probability to contribute to the programme abroad
(extensive margin).
(1)
OLS

(2)
Logit

0.030
(0.058)
0.039
(0.059)
0.018
(0.060)

0.022
(0.058)
0.032
(0.056)
0.0048
(0.055)

Covariates

Yes

Yes

Observations

256

256

Efﬁciency treatment (T1)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3)

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*
p < 0.10.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.

OLS and logit models presented in Table 6, showing that the effect
of the treatments on this outcome variable was not statistically
signiﬁcant.9
As presented in Table A.5 in Appendix A, the Cragg model provided very similar results to those in Tables 5 and 6. That is, it
showed that T1 was not effective on the extensive margin, but it was
on the intensive margin, and so increased average contributions to
the international programme by about 11 percentage points.
Hence, while T1 had a positive impact on the average contribution to the international programme, this treatment did not affect
the proportion of individuals contributing a positive amount to
this programme, i.e. the extensive margin. That is, participants that
were already predisposed to contribute to the programme abroad
were likely to increase their contribution, whereas the remaining
participants were likely to be unaffected. Hence, in presence of
strong preferences for the local programme, the efﬁciency treatment may not be effective.
Heterogeneous effects
To disentangle the heterogeneous effects of our most effective
treatment (T1) on different subgroups of the sample, we tested several extensions of Eq. (1), adding interaction terms. We expected
some sub-samples to be particularly affected by the efﬁciency treatment. We tested the interaction between the efﬁciency treatment
and the following dummy variables: offsetting abroad is acceptable;
ethical reservations with respect to the commodiﬁcation of nature; and
economic growth, rather than environmental protection, is the priority. Similarly to the main model in the second stage, we estimated
the coefﬁcients with OLS. All the results were statistically the same
if estimated with GLM.
Column (1) shows the heterogeneous effect of T1 on individuals who think that it is morally acceptable to compensate CO2
emissions abroad. Not surprisingly, as presented in Table 7, only
those considering carbon offsets generated abroad as acceptable
reacted to the informational treatment, whereas those expressing ethical concerns were more likely to remain on their positions.
This supported the evidence provided on the treatment effect on
the extensive margin. Relatedly, column (2) shows that only the
participants that did not have ethical reservations related to the
commodiﬁcation of nature were affected by the efﬁciency treatment. Finally, we looked at whether “green” individuals were more
or less responsive to the efﬁciency treatment than the rest of the
sample. We used as proxy for greenness the WVS question “Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if

9
Results including covariates are presented in Table A.4 in Appendix A. Estimates
from a probit model would lead to the same conclusion.

the environment suffers to some extent”. Interestingly, we found
that, on average, “green” participants tended to react more than the
average individual to the efﬁciency treatment. This suggested that,
absent any external intervention, people caring for the environment might have been reticent to contribute in “large” proportions
to the international programme, but stressing the higher environmental impacts achieved abroad with the same amount of money
might have been effective in spurring participation to the international reforestation programme.
Discussion
We found that informational treatments emphasising the costeffectiveness of international offset programs could increase the
demand for the latter. Our lab experiment suggested that there
were information asymmetries, between our participants and
economists, on the beneﬁts of international abatements. In our context, an informational treatment was sufﬁcient to address part of
these asymmetries. We consider that our ﬁndings can have important implications for policy makers, with a caveat, related to their
external validity. In what follows, we ﬁrst discuss the policy implications, and then address the caveat.
Following the recent scandals related to Joint Implementation
projects, most attention has been given to re-establishing the credibility of international offset programmes. Efforts in this direction
are welcome, but our results seem to imply that credibility may not
be the main concern for the general public. While for economists
it is obvious that efﬁciency reasons would play in favour of abating
emissions where it is cheapest, assuming that this is obvious also for
lay people may be misleading. Information should thus be provided
to make people understand why it is so important to undertake
emissions abatements in developing countries. Other valid arguments oppose the use of international carbon abatements, but our
results suggest that stressing the importance of providing a higher
environmental beneﬁt could lead an important share of contributions to switch from the local to the international programme.
Even though our paper differs in perspective and results, we join
Diederich and Goeschl (2017, p. 17) in their conclusion: “locational
preferences need not stand in the way of realising the gains from
comparative advantage in climate change mitigation”. Our policy
implications may also extend to linked carbon markets, an option
that is currently receiving serious consideration in many jurisdictions having implemented emissions trading schemes. Besides the
issue of reliability, linking carbon markets between developed and
emerging countries would also require sufﬁcient political support
in the former, backing the purchase of carbon allowances from lowand middle-income countries. Therefore, reducing opposition to
abatements taking place abroad may be highly beneﬁcial for the
prospect of future climate policy.
These policy implications depend on whether our ﬁndings can
be applied to a broader context. Proving the external validity of
our results is beyond the scope of this experimental investigation, hence the caveat. While the evidence covered the background
section supports the external validity of lab experiments, one can
always argue that preferences for policy are context-speciﬁc. To
put our results into perspective, we refer to the growing literature on public support for environmental policies, to which our
paper is closely related. This literature has provided a set of recurrent ﬁndings, regardless of whether the methods used consisted
in experimental approaches with students (e.g. Cherry et al., 2012,
2014; Kallbekken et al., 2011), qualitative surveys and focus groups
(e.g. Dresner et al., 2006; Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010), quantitative
surveys and choice experiments (e.g. Bristow et al., 2010; Sælen and
Kallbekken, 2011; Baranzini and Carattini, 2017), survey panels in a
quasi-experimental setting (Schuitema et al., 2010; Carattini et al.,
2016), or surveys combined with the observation of real ballots
(Thalmann, 2004; Carattini et al., 2017a). All these studies provide
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Table 7
Heterogeneous treatment effects.
(1)
Offsetting abroad is
acceptable
T1 × Offset abroad
T1 × NO offset abroad

(2)
Ethical reservations w.r.t.
commodiﬁcation of nature

(3)
Economic growth is the priority
(vs. the environment)

0.16*
(0.08)
0.096
(0.07)

T1 × Ethical reservations

0.068
(0.08)
0.15**
(0.08)

T1 × NO ethical reservations
T1 × Economy the priority

0.024
(0.06)
−0.022
(0.06)
0.44***
(0.09)

0.023
(0.06)
−0.023
(0.06)
0.422***
(0.09)

0.055
(0.13)
0.12*
(0.06)
0.025
(0.06)
−0.022
(0.06)
0.44***
(0.09)

Covariates

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations
R2
Adjusted-R2

256
0.19
0.15

256
0.19
0.15

256
0.19
0.15

T1 × Economy NOT the priority
Conﬁdence treatment
Local beneﬁts treatment
Constant

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. T1 represents the efﬁciency treatment. In all speciﬁcations we controlled for beliefs about others’ contribution and
frequent forest users, experience with the domestic site, acceptability of offsets abroad, ethical reservations against the commodiﬁcation of nature, climate concern, green
membership and economic growth as the priority (vs. the environment).
*
p < 0.1.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.

evidence of a gap between people’s perceptions and economists’
prescriptions, which contributes to explain an important part of the
resistance to cost-effective environmental policies, such as carbon
taxes.
This gap is very similar to that observed in our lab experiment.
Hence, one could extrapolate to our context and support the external validity of our results. Furthermore, given that the participants
in our study have some knowledge of economics, our experimental results are likely to provide lower-bound estimates. That is, if
anything, asymmetries of information are likely to be larger with
a fully representative sample. In our opinion, however, the main
contribution of our paper relies on its novelty, rather than on its
generalisability. We provide original ﬁndings and put forward a set
of potential policy implications, whose relevance for other contexts
may be investigated in future studies. Our paper, along with the
concurrent studies by Anderson and Bernauer (2016) and Diederich
and Goeschl (2017), represents indeed an initial investigation into
a new research area on people’s preferences for local and international abatements.
Several avenues for future research follow from our paper. While
we consider reforestation programmes, the same research question
applies also to other offset programmes, for which the difference in
cost-effectiveness between programmes in developed and developing countries may be even larger. In addition, future research
may include more than two countries, with varying costs and institutional features. Methodologically speaking, such analyses may
not only be possible in the lab. Choice experiments, for instance,
would be particularly suited to analyse the demand for carbon offsets, including location as one of many attributes and split designs
to allow for randomised treatments. Researchers could also partner with companies offering carbon offsets, as in Kesternich et al.
(2016), and analyse this question directly in the ﬁeld. The larger and
more representative the sample, with choice-experiment surveys
or ﬁeld experiments, the stronger the external validity. Qualitative
studies could also offer a complementary perspective to this emerg-

ing literature, providing valuable information on how people’s
backgrounds and knowledge about efﬁciency and international carbon offsets may affect their preferences. Qualitative studies could
also involve policy-makers, to understand the political economy
of climate policies that restrict the use of international carbon offsets. Finally, further research could also extend the analysis to the
role of local pollution. The more international carbon offsets can be
used, the lower the beneﬁts of climate policy in terms of local air
pollution and health. Especially in the presence of carbon trading
schemes, and potential hot spots (cf. Fowlie et al., 2012), each additional unit of abatement that takes place abroad can have negative
implications for the local population because of the co-generation
of local and global pollutants.
Conclusion
Turning the Paris Agreement’s Nationally Determined Contributions into operational policies is the next challenge for policy
makers. However, many political obstacles hamper the realisation
of pledges in a cost-effective way. One of these is public resistance
to the use of carbon credits and carbon offsets associated with
greenhouse gas abatements in foreign countries. We addressed
this issue in an experimental framework, in which participants
were requested to allocate funding between a domestic and an
international reforestation programme, the latter taking place in
a developing country, where reforestation is cheaper.
We applied several informational treatments and found that the
allocation decision was responsive to the provision of information
on the cost-effectiveness of the reforestation programme implemented abroad. On the contrary, the decision was not particularly
responsive to guarantees addressing a potential lack of credibility of the reforestation programme in the developing country and
to information on the local beneﬁts associated with the domestic programme. Our results suggest that stressing the potential for
higher abatements in foreign countries is effective in changing par-
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ticipants’ priors in favour of international carbon offsets. Hence,
individuals may be willing to increase their support for the use of
international carbon offsets and related carbon markets, provided
that they are in position to appreciate their environmental beneﬁts.
Our novel ﬁndings contribute to the literature on the acceptability of climate policy instruments and on the emerging literature on
carbon offsets. They suggest that some of the potential resistance
to the use of carbon credits and carbon offsets generated in foreign
countries may be, to some extent, spurious. Effective communication from policy makers could then address, and partly overcome,
as in our experiment, such resistance. As policy-makers take their
time to implement the required policies, the level of stringency
requested to meet the climate targets increases. International carbon offsets could represent an important solution to ensure that
the current pledges are met, thus supporting the Paris Agreement’s
ratchet mechanism, and the durability of the whole agreement.

Table A.3 (Continued)

Second-year student
Frequent forest user
Experience with domestic site
Offsetting abroad is acceptable
Ethical reservations w.r.t. to the
commodiﬁcation of nature
Carbon markets are acceptable
Green member
Observations
Adjusted R2

Appendix A.

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

Endowment CHF
Contribution > 0 0/1
Contribution (% of initial endowment)
Climate concern 0/1
Small contributions are important 0/1
Green member 0/1
Moral obligation 0/1
Belief about others’ contribution (% of
initial endowment)
Frequent forest user 0/1
Practical reservations w.r.t.
reforestation 0/1
Ethical reservations w.r.t. the
commodiﬁcation of nature 0/1

7.2
0.86
0.70
0.86
0.85
0.09
0.67
0.53

1.87
0.35
0.4
0.34
0.36
0.29
0.47
0.30

2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

10
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

299
299
299
299
299
299
299
299

0.19
0.27

0.39
0.45

0
0

1
1

299
299

0.48

0.5

0

1

299

Efﬁciency treatment
Conﬁdence treatment
Local beneﬁts treatment
Belief about others’ contribution abroad

Frequent forest user
Experience with domestic site

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

Belief about others’ contribution
abroad 0/1
Second-year student 0/1
Frequent forest user 0/1
Experience with domestic site 0/1
Offsetting abroad is acceptable 0/1
Ethical reservations w.r.t. the
commodiﬁcation of nature 0/1
Carbon markets are acceptable 0/1
Green member 0/1
Economy the priority 0/1

0.70

0.46

0

1

256

0.43
0.19
0.35
0.29
0.49

0.520
0.39
0.48
0.45
0.50

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

256
256
256
256
256

0.21
0.10
0.11

0.41
0.30
0.31

0
0
0

1
1
1

256
256
256

Table A.3
Average treatment effects

Local beneﬁts treatment (T3)
Belief about others’ contribution abroad

0.068*
(0.04)
0.033
(0.06)
−0.043
(0.04)
0.019
(0.04)
−0.031

0.067*
(0.04)
0.034
(0.06)
−0.043
(0.04)
0.023
(0.04)
−0.032

(0.04)
0.0083
(0.05)
0.10
(0.06)

(0.04)
−0.0069
(0.05)
0.11
(0.07)

256
0.15

256

Table A.4
Average treatment effects on the probability to contribute (extensive margin).

Second-year student

Table A.2
Descriptive statistics (2nd stage).

Conﬁdence treatment (T2)

(2)
GLM

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*
p < 0.1.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.

Table A.1
Descriptive statistics (1st stage).

Efﬁciency treatment (T1)

(1)
OLS

(1)
OLS

(2)
GLM

0.11*
(0.06)
0.026
(0.06)
−0.025
(0.06)
0.26***
(0.05)

0.12*
(0.06)
0.025
(0.06)
−0.024
(0.05)
0.24***
(0.04)

Offsetting abroad is acceptable
Ethical reservations w.r.t. to the
commodiﬁcation of nature
Carbon markets are acceptable
Green member
Covariates
Observations

(1)
Logit

(2)
OLS

0.022
(0.058)
0.032
(0.056)
0.0048
(0.055)
0.19***
(0.029)
0.029
(0.039)
0.042
(0.059)
−0.024
(0.040)
0.068
(0.051)
0.013

0.030
(0.058)
0.039
(0.059)
0.018
(0.060)
0.22***
(0.054)
0.025
(0.041)
0.040
(0.048)
−0.022
(0.042)
0.056
(0.042)
0.010

(0.039)
−0.040
(0.049)
0.13
(0.11)

(0.040)
−0.030
(0.051)
0.081
(0.051)

Yes
256

Yes
256

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*
p < 0.10.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.

Table A.5
Average marginal effects from Cragg model: second stage.
Contributions to the international programme > 0 (0/1)
Efﬁciency treatment (T1)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3)

0.021
(0.056)
0.029
(0.054)
0.0038
(0.054)
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Table A.5 (Continued)
Belief about others’ contribution abroad
Second-year student
Frequent forest user
Experience with domestic site
Offsetting abroad is acceptable
Ethical reservations w.r.t commodiﬁcation of nature
Carbon markets are acceptable
Green member
Contribution to the international programme (% of total contribution)
Efﬁciency treatment (T1)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3)
Belief about others’ contribution abroad
Second-year student
Frequent forest user
Experience with domestic site
Offsetting abroad is acceptable
Ethical reservations w.r.t commodiﬁcation of nature
Carbon markets are acceptable
Green member
Observations

0.18***
(0.037)
0.033
(0.039)
0.030
(0.054)
−0.026
(0.039)
0.052
(0.046)
0.013
(0.038)
−0.021
(0.048)
0.092
(0.088)
0.11**
(0.046)
−0.0050
(0.047)
−0.044
(0.047)
0.13***
(0.040)
0.059*
(0.032)
0.0070
(0.047)
−0.027
(0.037)
−0.018
(0.034)
−0.046
(0.033)
0.024
(0.041)
0.052
(0.051)
256

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*
p < 0.1.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.

Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfe.2018.02.004.
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Sterner, T., 2012. Paying for mitigation: a multiple country study? Land Econ.
88 (2), 326–340.
Cherry, T.L., Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., 2012. The acceptability of efﬁciency-enhancing
environmental taxes, subsidies and regulation: an experimental investigation.
Environ. Sci. Policy 16, 90–96.
Cherry, T.L., Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., 2014. The impact of trial runs on the
acceptability of environmental taxes: experimental evidence. Resour. Energy
Econ. 38 (C), 84–95.
Cragg, J.G., 1971. Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with
application to the demand for durable goods. Econometrica, 829–844.
Czajkowski, M., Bartczak, A., Giergiczny, M., Navrud, S., Żylicz, T., 2014. Providing
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